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Preface
The impact of oil prices across the IMF's membership since mid-2014 has had broad implications for the work of the IMF. These developments were first discussed in a much-read blog by Olivier Blanchard and Rabah Arezki in December 2014. Since then, bilateral Article IV consultations, regional economic reports, and the IMF's flagship publications-the World Economic Outlook, Global Financial Stability Report and Fiscal Monitor-have all devoted considerable attention to issues related to oil prices.
In early 2015, IMF management established an interdepartmental working group to develop an integrated institutional view on developments in oil and other key energy markets, and their implications for policy advice to member countries. This paper brings together contributions of the working group to date as well as related work by staff that has appeared in recent IMF publications. IMF staff will continue to provide research and policy analysis on this topic.
This report is based on information as of June 4, 2015.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. Lower oil prices should translate into higher spending and therefore support global growth. The size of the impact will depend on the underlying drivers of the price decline, the extent of pass-through to households and firms and how much of it they spend, and policy responses.
Although oil price gains and losses across producers and consumers sum to zero, the net effect on global activity is positive. The reasons are twofold: simply put, the increase in spending by oil importers is likely to exceed the decline in spending by exporters, and lower production costs will stimulate supply in other sectors for which oil is an input.
2. Supply factors have played a somewhat larger role than demand factors in driving the 50 percent drop in the price of oil between mid-2014 and early 2015. Higher oil production resulted partly from non-OPEC developments (especially U.S. shale), but also higher-than-expected OPEC output in countries such as Iraq, Libya, and Saudi Arabia. Demand was weaker than expected in Europe and Asia. While increased financial flows into oil in recent years may have contributed to increased volatility of oil prices, it is hard to find clear evidence of speculative forces or financialization driving the price decline. Weaker demand and substitution effects have pushed down prices of other energy commodities.
3. The oil price outlook is highly uncertain, but a substantial part of the oil price decline is expected to persist into the medium term. Futures markets imply an increase in Brent oil prices to some $75 a barrel in 2020, but recent experience-including the Brent price rally to about $65 a barrel in April-suggests there may be considerable volatility around this upward trend. The IMF uses futures contracts for its baseline assumptions for oil prices. There is no simple alternative to futures for price forecasting at this stage; institutions using models missed the large price drop as well. An alternative supply-demand model being developed by IMF staff also points to gradually higher oil prices over the longer term-needed to ensure sufficient investment in production capacity to meet growing demand-but there is a very wide range of uncertainty.
4. By end-2014, retail fuel prices had declined globally, on average, by only half as much as world oil prices. Europe has had the highest pass-through; countries in the Middle East and subSaharan Africa have generally had the lowest. Reflecting this, the fiscal costs (explicit and implicit) of low domestic prices have declined and net fuel taxes have increased, implying significant fiscal/quasi-fiscal benefits. Among oil exporters, the lower costs of providing cheap domestic energy have partly offset the loss in hydrocarbon revenue.
5. 5After accounting for the limited pass-through to retail prices, the fall in oil prices should boost global growth by about ½ percentage point in 2015-16, but other shocks are expected to offset this positive effect. Headwinds include slowing growth in emerging markets and developing countries; these are partly related to structural bottlenecks, reassessment of potential growth, and geopolitical risks. As a result, the global growth forecast has been revised down since the October 2014 edition of the IMF's World Economic Outlook (WEO). In some oil-importing countries, the positive growth effects of lower global oil prices have been muted by exchange rate depreciation and lower non-oil commodity prices (in the case of non-oil commodity exporters).
Some low-income oil importers could be hurt by lower remittances and foreign aid from oil exporters. However, even in the oil importers where the growth benefits are not immediate, lower crude oil prices benefit public and private sector balance sheets, in turn supporting medium-term growth prospects.
6. The speed and magnitude of the oil price decline has the potential to trigger financial strains, which could reduce the global benefits of lower oil prices, although the effects have so far been contained. Countries and companies dependent on oil revenues have already been significantly re-priced, especially those with existing vulnerabilities, but the impact may not yet have been fully felt. In particular, a number of energy firms accumulated sizable debt during the period of high oil prices, and some banking systems saw a marked increase in loan exposures to the energy sector. Moreover, the redistribution of wealth among investors with varying saving and portfolio preferences could have market repercussions, and those effects will also take time to play out. For those concerned about market infrastructure, there does not appear to be evidence of dislocations in the oil markets so far. Nevertheless, significant changes in the composition of oil market participants suggest policymakers should remain vigilant about the possibility of disorderly market functioning.
7. Policy responses to lower oil prices should depend on the terms of trade impact, fiscal and external vulnerabilities, domestic cyclical position, and persistence of the shock.

Because the oil price drop is expected to have a large permanent component, oil exporters will need fiscal adjustments, with their magnitude and pace varying according to the size of buffers (fiscal vulnerability). In addition, for some exporters-especially those with external vulnerabilities and/or fiscal policy rigidities-exchange rate flexibility could facilitate adjustment. The monetary policy response will need to be tailored to the domestic cyclical position, inflation expectations, and any external pressures. Countries exposed to potential financial strains would benefit from strengthening their macroprudential policy frameworks. Lower oil prices also underscore the need for real and financial sector reforms to foster diversification of oil exporters' economies. Similarly, firms using oil in production have benefited from lower input prices in these countries. The implied decline in firms' marginal costs should translate into lower producer prices for their goods and services.
These real income gains should result in higher spending and, other factors unchanged, a boost to global growth. This "demand channel" plays an important role in the transmission of the fall in oil prices, and much depends on how large the real income gains are. But the flipside to windfall gains is the income losses of oil producers. The full global economic impact depends on a number of factors, including the nature and magnitude of the oil price decline and the size of the price decline experienced by oil users, among others.
Starting with the nature of the oil price decline, two aspects are critical.

Underlying drivers of the price decline. Lower oil prices can be a cause ("shock") driving global economic activity or a response to other shocks driving global growth. In the former, the decline is driven by factors not related to current global economic conditions, say changes in oil supply due to technology. In the latter, the lower prices would be a symptom of other unexpected changes to global economic activity, including, for example, a demand shock in a major economy with significant spillovers to many other economies. Another critical factor for the impact is the extent of price pass-through. Put simply, the issue is how much of the decline in world crude prices translates into a drop in petroleum prices at the retail level. The often small initial pass-through observed in practice partly reflects the usual short-term price rigidities or exchange rate fluctuations, or both. But in many emerging market and developing economies, administrative controls on energy prices, often in the context of fuel price subsidies, provide for more sustained limited pass-through. Section III on retail prices and fiscal implications finds that the degree of pass-through has varied sharply across countries.
With limited pass-through, some of the real income gains will accrue to the government or energy companies, rather than households and other end users. The distribution will depend on the specifics of the subsidy and pricing regimes. The macroeconomic impact will then depend not only on the spending behavior of households and firms, but also on the fiscal policy response to such oil-related windfall gains (for instance, the government could either save the windfall, cut distortionary taxes, or invest in highly productive infrastructure) or factors affecting the spending behavior of energy companies. In the extreme, if there were no price pass-through to end users and if the government or energy companies saved all the windfall gains, there would be no transmission to demand channels, although even then there could be benefits through lower government borrowing costs, improved financial balance sheet positions, and confidence effects.
Lower oil prices benefit users, but for owners of oil resources and the oil sector more broadly, they result in real income losses. Countries with a small domestic oil sector (net oil importers)
benefit from real income gains, as the lower import prices point to terms-of-trade gains. By contrast, in countries where the oil sector is large or even dominant (net oil exporters), other activity depends importantly on oil revenue, including through the public spending that revenue permits. Such countries experience a terms-of-trade loss.  In late 2014, oil prices and energy companies' stocks diverged to an unusual degree. At the same time, however, the net long position of speculative players increased even as oil prices continued to fall. This suggests that, at least during this episode, investors' financial flows were not driving the direction of oil price swings.
5 Cheng and Xiong (2014) review the channels through which financial investors may affect oil prices, with risk sharing and information discovery highlighted as two important mechanisms.
6 As the lefthand text chart indicates, a similar temporary disconnect between spot oil prices and equity prices of oil companies-but in the opposite direction-was evident in mid-2008 when spot prices neared $150 a barrel.
7 According to the IEA, global oil supply significantly exceeded consumption in 2014Q2-Q4 by an average of 1 million barrels per day (mbd), with part of this market excess resulting in higher U.S. inventories and part not being explained reflecting unreported stocks in OECD countries or stocks in non-OECD countries.  In April 2015, by contrast, oil prices rebounded despite an oversupplied market. It is difficult to assess whether this was due to purely financial factors or news pointing to a future tightening of oil market balances.
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B. Oil Price Outlook
The degree of the drop in oil prices was not predicted by the futures markets, and caught most forecasters by surprise. Consensus Forecasts showed nobody predicting a steep price fall in August 2014 and only one institution adjusting its forecast to about $50 a barrel in October, shortly before the OPEC meeting. Institutions using models also missed the price fall. drilling rigs), with capacity already in place from previous large investments, oil production will likely take time to adjust to the new, low price environment, as was the case in the 1980s when non-OPEC production continued to grow in the early years of the price decline. That said, the shorter-term investment horizon of nontraditional production may result in quicker adjustment.
8 Barclays (2015) suggests the recent price rally can mostly be explained by market fundamentals such as easing excess supply and a weaker U.S. dollar. Goldman Sachs (2015) argues that the investors' expectations of tightening oil market balances are premature.
9 The IMF's WEO has traditionally used futures prices for the oil price baseline. Both Energy Information Agency (EIA) and IEA use oil price futures in combination with judgmental assessment of market conditions for short-to mediumterm price forecasting. Both institutions use models for gauging long-term prices. IMF staff are developing a supply-demand model for predicting oil prices. The model weighs the gradual depletion of conventional oil stock against new discoveries and demand trends.
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It predicts rising oil prices over the medium term, so that sufficient investment takes place to expand supply capacity to meet growing demand. At the same time, illustrative scenarios show enormous uncertainty around the fundamental forces at play. These include energy efficiency, substitution from oil to other energy sources, and climate change policies.
C. Spillover to Prices of Other Energy Commodities
Natural gas prices have also moved downward, with a differentiated impact across regional markets. Despite the wide differentials in natural gas price levels across continents due to regionspecific factors, the evidence suggests gas prices tend to follow oil prices with a lag, implying the prospect of further softening in the months ahead. In North America, expanding shale gas 
Natural Gas and Crude Oil Prices
Source: IMF, Primary Commodity Price System. Note: Average Petroleum Spot Price (APSP) is the simple average of Brent, WTI, and Dubai oil prices. MMBTu is one million British Thermal Units.
Coal prices are formally not linked to oil prices but have followed oil, given substitution opportunities and a common cycle. Coal prices have been declining since early 2011, partly because of the slowdown in emerging markets and displacement by cheap natural gas in the United
States. Since coal prices have halved already, the room for downward adjustment resulting from lower oil prices may be limited. However, potentially lower growth in emerging markets, combined with a further decline in oil prices, could push coal prices down some more.
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR RETAIL FUEL PRICES AND PUBLIC FINANCES A. Pass-Through into Retail Fuel Prices
Lower global crude oil prices have not fully passed through to domestic retail prices. The extent to which domestic prices respond depends on price setting (market-based versus regulated), tax structure, and policy responses. Analysis of retail price data suggests that the median passthrough to gasoline and diesel prices was about 50 percent in the second half of 2014.
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 The pass-through has, so far, been similar to the second half of 2008 (40 percent), when international prices also fell sharply.
The pass-through is likely to increase further as countries continue to adjust, for instance, due to formula-based pricing.
Over longer periods, the pass-through tends to be higher (for example, the passthrough was 80 percent between end-2008 and mid-2014).
 There are wide differences across regions. The Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa have had the lowest pass-through. This reflects a larger incidence of countries with regulated prices. Europe, where prices are largely liberalized, has the highest median pass-through. In general, advanced economies tend to have higher pass-through than emerging markets and developing countries.
11 Pass-through is calculated as the absolute change in domestic retail prices (end-of-period) divided by the absolute change in international prices, both in domestic currency, over a period. The pass-through for kerosene was less than 30 percent, but the estimate is based on a smaller sample.  There are also large differences within regions, partly reflecting discretionary policy responses to fiscal pressures or fuel pricing reforms. For example, the pass-through was significantly negative (domestic prices rose) in Ghana, Angola, and Cameroon, and to a lesser degree in Brazil and Mexico. In others, the pass-through was positive and higher than the median (for example Zambia and Guinea-Bissau); see Boxes 1 and 2.
B. Impact on Public Finances
Net fuel taxes rose in 2014, reflecting the partial adjustment in domestic prices. and not just budgetary subsidies (that is, the estimated savings reflect the cost/saving from the higher/lower gap between international and domestic prices). In the case of oil exporters, the "fiscal savings" may not impact the budget (quasi-fiscal activities) 12 The note estimates fuel net taxes/subsidies based on price gaps between domestic and international prices for petroleum products. As such, it does not capture all possible fiscal costs (for example, subsidies to electricity). 
Average Fiscal Savings in 2014
(Gasoline and diesel, in percent of GDP) or, if they do, will mostly be reflected as a lower fall in oil-related revenue than what would be implied from the drop in oil prices.
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Middle East countries, where fuel prices tend to be low, are the ones that could potentially generate the largest fiscal savings. Still, countries across different regions (for example, Iran, Venezuela, and Croatia) have high costs associated with low fuel prices (more than 2 percent of GDP).
However, the savings could be partly reversed if there is no policy action. Despite some progress in reforming energy prices (Box 3), most recent fiscal gains resulted from the partial passthrough to domestic prices. Based on past episodes, countries-especially oil importers-will tend to adjust domestic prices further over time, leading to lower fiscal savings. In countries with regulated prices, the savings could vanish (at least partially) when oil prices rebound.
Box 1. Price Pass-Through in Sub-Saharan Africa and Western Hemisphere Countries
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa (AFR) regulate fuel prices with discretionary adjustments, resulting in a low pass-through to the fall in oil prices. Slightly more than half of African countries regulate fuel prices in a discretionary way, while 40 percent rely on automatic adjustment formulas. Retail prices fell in most countries in the second half of 2014, but at a slower pace than the drop in international prices. In some countries (Angola, Cameroon, Ghana, and Madagascar), domestic prices rose in the context of fuel pricing reforms. As in other regions, the pass-through among net oil exporters was smaller (close to zero).
Price adjustment mechanisms among countries in the Western Hemisphere (WHD) vary widely, with about one-third allowing domestic fuel prices to be fully market determined. The remainder is split between countries with discretionary price adjustment and those where prices are adjusted through a formula. In addition to countries with market determined prices, about one-quarter of countries in the regulated-prices category (for example, Chile, Costa Rica, and Guatemala) are also expected to allow full pass-through. Overall, it is expected that about two-thirds of countries in the region will allow a full pass-through by December 2015.
WHD countries allowing only limited or no pass-through at all comprise primarily net oil exporters. In most of these countries, a state-owned oil company maintains a large or sole presence in the energy sector and, thus, the gains of lower oil prices accrue mostly to the public sector. 
Box 2. Shifting from Fuel Subsidies to Net Taxes
In some countries, the drop in international prices led to elimination of net subsidies. For example, Mexico has maintained a system of variable excises. When international fuel prices are high, these excises turn into a subsidy, and when prices are low, they turn into a tax. Under this system, there have been no fuel subsidies in Mexico since December 2014, and the increase in fiscal revenues from these excises offsets an important fraction of the decline in export-related fiscal revenues. The Mexican authorities plan to fully liberalize domestic fuel prices in 2018.
Box 3. Energy Subsidies Following the Oil Price Decline in Jordan and Egypt
Some countries are adopting reforms to reduce subsidies:
 Losses at Jordan's electricity company (NEPCO) are falling at a faster pace thanks to lower oil prices. Until 2010, the electricity company had a balanced budget when it was receiving gas from Egypt at below-market price. Since then, gas from Egypt has gradually come to a halt, requiring the import of expensive petroleum products. As a result, the company has been running large losses. The authorities have adopted a medium-term energy strategy to return the company to cost recovery. The main elements of the strategy are tariff increases, a diversification of energy sources, and measures to enhance efficiency. Prior to the decline in oil prices, NEPCO's losses were expected to decline from 4½ percent of GDP in 2014 to 3½ percent of GDP in 2015 following a tariff increase and the start of operations of the LNG terminal. However, thanks to the fall in oil prices, additional savings of about 1½ percent of GDP in 2015 are expected.
 Egypt is moving forward in reforming energy subsidies. Prior to the reform, in 2013/14, the budgetary cost of untargeted energy subsidies was more than 6 percent of GDP, reflecting their universal provision, as well as high international oil prices. To address the inefficiency and high budgetary costs of generalized subsidies, the authorities decided in July 2014 to drastically raise domestic prices on a range of fuel products. The measure is expected to deliver budget savings of about 2 percent of GDP for 2014/15. The authorities intend to totally eliminate energy subsidies over the next five years, with the exception of those for liquefied pure gas, which are targeted to the poor.
 Fuel subsidies in Sudan have significantly declined since 2013. In response to the fiscal pressures, the government of Sudan sharply raised domestic fuel prices in late 2013, reducing subsidies by more than 1 percent of GDP in 2014. The recent decline in international oil prices will further reduce those subsidies, which the authorities plan to eliminate by 2019.  Incomplete price pass-through. As illustrated in Section III, many governments control the domestic prices of petroleum products through a variety of instruments. The oil windfall gains or losses do not fully accrue to the private sector, but to fiscal or quasi-fiscal authorities, including state-owned energy companies.
IV. MACROECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF LOWER OIL PRICES
14 See Hunt, Muir, and Sommer (2015) for a detailed general equilibrium analysis of expanding oil production in the main world regions using IMF's GIMF and GEM models.
The two model scenarios presented in this section differ in the assumptions about passthrough. The first scenario (shown with blue lines in Figure 1 ) assumes that the decline in world oil prices is passed on fully to households and firms in all countries. While very stylized, it provides a useful point of reference. The second scenario broadly replicates the current pricing regimes discussed in the previous section. In advanced economies, the pass-through is complete. In most emerging market and developing economies and in oil producers, it is incomplete.
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The simulation results confirm that global output effects depend on the degree of price passthrough. If the decline in global oil prices since August 2014 were to fully pass through to domestic end-user prices, global GDP-excluding those countries in which oil supply is increasing-would rise by roughly 1 percent in the first two years (Figure 1) . If the decline in oil prices were to fail to fully pass through and the resulting increase in fiscal revenue were to be saved, the increase in global GDP would be reduced by almost half.
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The simulations illustrate how in countries with managed retail prices, the boost to growth can be much more modest (as shown in the charts for China and India in Figure 1 ). The growth effect would be larger if the government used the windfall to cut distortionary taxes or make efficient investments. More limited pass-through would also moderate the impact of the decline in oil prices on global inflation, albeit by a relatively small margin.
Revisions to WEO forecasts since October 2014 have not resulted in predictions of higher
global growth during 2015-16. Instead, global growth projections have been modestly revised down. Those for oil exporters have been lowered substantially, as was to be expected, while those for emerging market and developing oil importers have also been either lowered or unchanged, rather than increased (Table 1) . On the other hand, the downward revisions to price levels have been substantial, as have the revisions to fiscal balances of oil exporters. The revisions to fiscal balances of oil importers were small on average, given high pass-through of lower oil prices to retail prices in advanced economies, and adverse shocks affecting growth in emerging markets and developing countries. The decline in oil prices, which began in June 2014, has also not resulted in higher global growth in that year, relative to what was expected before the decline, including relative to forecasts in the April 2014 WEO (see Box 4 for a historical perspective on the macroeconomic effects of oil price declines). 15 The specific assumptions underlying the incomplete pass-through in each country build on the work and references presented in Section III. 16 Despite the limited immediate boost to activity, lower crude oil prices would benefit public and private sector balance sheets, in turn supporting medium-term growth prospects.
What explains this apparent disconnect between simulations and revisions to projections?
Staff analysis points to the following factors:
 Other shocks. Many major economies have experienced other shocks, ranging from the implications of the Ukraine conflict for Russia to stronger-than-expected effects of fiscal consolidation in Japan. Also, the deceleration in growth in China is expected to continue, and conflicts in the Middle East have intensified. Such decline in activity due to other shocks has contributed to the oil price decline, as discussed in Section II on the oil market. Model simulations confirm that in scenarios where the increased oil supply explains much-but not all-of the oil price decline in 2014 because of other adverse demand shocks in some economies, these adverse demand factors can broadly offset the positive impact of the oil supply shock. This reflects the fact that the positive effects of even large oil price changes on activity in oil importers are relatively small because the share of oil in total expenditure and costs is small, even in relatively oil-intensive economies.
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In addition, activity in some commodity exporters many be held back by the simultaneous drop in non-oil commodity prices.
 Initial conditions. Interactions between initial conditions can lead to situations where lower oil prices will have a smaller impact on spending by households and firms. In particular, in view of still unresolved balance sheet strains after the global financial crisis in some advanced economies, some of the real income (windfall) gains in these economies will be used to retire debt, rather than be spent.
 Policy responses.
In a number of oil-importing economies, IMF staff assume that governments or state-owned energy companies will save the oil windfall gains not only initially, as assumed in the simulations, but more permanently. Put differently, the oil windfall gains offer authorities an opportunity to help improve their fiscal positions without hurting domestic demand. In fact, Ratios are in percent of GDP; differences are in percentage points. 3 General government debt in percent of GDP; differences in percentage points. 4 Oil exporters are economies with a net oil export surplus in 2014.
5 GDP weights. For real GDP and inflation, the weights are based on Purchasing Power Parity GDP;
for the current account ratios, they are based on GDP at market exchange rates.
Revisions to Change between 2014 and 2016 Gen. Government For simplicity, the simulations assume that an increase in oil supply drives the full decline in the oil price path. Consequently, the simulations do not account for the implications of the decline in demand for oil that underlies a portion of the actual fall in oil prices. In addition, each country's domestic-currency price of oil has been adjusted to reflect the change in its bilateral U.S. dollar exchange rate since August 2014; however, the simulations do not include implications of the exchange rate changes for any other parts of the economy. 
Box 4. Comparing Three Major Episodes of Oil Price Declines
The large, abrupt oil price decline since June 2014 has been among the three largest declines over the past three decades. The other declines of similar magnitude were recorded in 1986, when OPEC members partly reversed previous production cuts, and in 2008-09 during the early stages of the global financial crisis (Box Figure) .
The reasons for the price drop have differed across these cases. The big-picture view is that in 1986, price declines were mostly supply-driven while in 2008-09, they were almost entirely demand-driven. Evidence to date suggests that supply factors have been important for the 2014 price decline (Box 1.1 in the April 2015 WEO).
The differences in underlying drivers can be seen clearly in the differences in output behavior in advanced economies across episodes. Growth was broadly stable in the first year for the price declines in 1986 and 2014, while output contracted sharply in 2008-09.
It is noteworthy, however, that there appears to be no sign of activity picking up in the first year of each price decline, not only since June 2014, but also in 1986. Monthly industrial production growth remained broadly flat, as did quarterly GDP growth.
The price pass-through, as measured by headline CPI inflation, was strong and immediate in each case. In fact, the inflation response in the current episode appears somewhat weaker. Another area where strong responses are apparent is current account balances, where the external positions of exporters worsen and those of importers improve. 
Box 5. Macroeconomic Effects of Lower Oil Prices in the Asia and Pacific Region
A counterfactual forecasting exercise for economies in the Asia and Pacific region illustrates the important role of initial conditions and precautionary policy responses to oil windfall gains for the small growth impact in economies in the region. For this exercise, IMF staff revised their October 2014 macroeconomic forecasts under the assumption that the oil price decline was the only change in assumptions. All other assumptions remained the same as they were for the October projections. The resulting changes in forecasts are summarized in the figures below. The increase in both private and public net saving ratios is striking. On the other hand, growth is broadly unchanged, because a sizable part of the windfall to net oil (and commodity) importers is expected to be saved, increasing current account surpluses.
Asia and Pacific: Impact of Oil Price Decline on Macroeconomic Forecasts (In percentage points of GDP; growth in percent)
Source: IMF staff estimates. Note: Deviation from October 2014 WEO as a result of the January 2015 WEO update's oil price baseline. S-I denotes the saving-investment balance. hedging horizon used by producers (Fitch, 2015) . Because the downdraft in oil prices began to accelerate only in September 2014-at which point Brent and WTI prices were still above $100
per barrel-aftershocks for the corporate sector may yet remain.
A prolonged period of low oil prices will put at risk the debt servicing capacity of exploration and production firms with a high cost base. The outstanding worldwide notional value of bank loans and corporate debt extended to the energy sector amounts to about US$3 trillion, US$247 billion of which is attributable to the U.S. high-yield bond market alone. Global issuance in 2014 was substantially higher than during the previous cycle peak in 2007 (Figure 2 , center left).
Additionally, the leveraged (that is, high-yield) share of syndicated oil and gas loan issuance has In some countries (for example, in the Caucasus and Central Asia), a decline in remittance flows from oil-producing countries has contributed to exchange rate pressures, bringing to the fore financial stability risks in their banking systems. In the Middle East and North Africa region, oil price declines led to broad-based declines in stock prices of oil-exporting countries, while government deposits in commercial banks have begun to be drawn down. 
B. Oil Surplus and Global Liquidity
VI. POLICY RESPONSE TO LOW OIL PRICES
Policy responses to lower oil prices, which are still being formulated in many countries, will depend on a complex set of factors. These include, for example, the size and direction of the terms-of-trade shock, the exchange rate regime, fiscal and external buffers, balance sheet mismatches, exchange rate valuation, the output gap, and inflation. To organize ideas, we propose a flexible policy framework to determine the appropriate mix of adjustment of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies. The framework-presented for clarity in a Venn diagram-frames choices through lenses of fiscal vulnerabilities, external vulnerabilities, and the cyclical position (Figure 3) , and is sufficiently flexible to allow for other country-specific circumstances such as the net direction of oil trade and exchange rate regime.
A. Oil Exporters
Since the oil price drop is expected to have a large permanent component, policies of oil exporters should focus on fiscal adjustment, supported by stronger medium-term fiscal frameworks. Oil receipts fell dramatically even for those exporters that increased oil production;
should oil prices turn out to be higher than the baseline projection, many exporters would still have their fiscal breakeven prices well above the usual range of oil price forecasts.
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How quickly the adjustment should proceed, and how far it needs to go, will depend on the size of buffers (fiscal vulnerability) and the scale of oil reserves. In addition, exporters with external vulnerabilities should consider depreciation and/or greater exchange rate flexibility. Strikingly, the largest negative termsof-trade shock has hit countries with fixed exchange rate regimes, putting additional pressure on other policies to deliver the needed adjustment in these countries that tend to be most reliant on oil exports (Figure 4 ). Monetary policy should strike the right balance between the domestic cycle and the degree of vulnerabilities ( Figure 5 ). Countries exposed to potential financial strains would benefit from strengthening their macroprudential policy frameworks. 
B. Oil Importers
The key question faced by oil importers, by contrast, is how much of the windfall to save in cases where retail prices do not adjust automatically. In general, lower oil prices will improve household real incomes, corporate profits in the non-oil sector, and fiscal positions where energy subsidies are large (see Section III). The Venn diagram suggests that the higher the level of vulnerabilities, and the more advanced the business cycle, the more of the windfall countries should save to rebuild policy buffers and slow the impact on aggregate demand ( Figure 6 ). Fiscal consolidation policies will generally be easier to implement in the countries where the benefits of lower oil prices accrue mostly to the public sector. Meanwhile, countries should use the period of lower oil prices as an opportunity to strengthen the credibility of their monetary policy frameworks.
Evidence of second-round disinflationary effects could open space for reducing policy rates in some countries, while countries at risk of deflation should loosen monetary policy and save less-or none-of the windfall. There may also be scope in some countries to allocate part of the windfall to investment and social spending.
 For countries that are outside of the Venn space, and have a negative output gap, policies should allow domestic demand to rise by the full amount of the windfall (in countries in this situation, but with a high degree of pass-through into retail prices such as the United States, there is no need for policy adjustment). Lower energy prices also provide a window to consider increasing energy taxation while reducing other distortionary taxes or raising priority spending.
 For countries with fiscal and external vulnerabilities such as Egypt, priority should be given to putting fiscal and external positions on a more sustainable footing by saving the fiscal windfall from lower energy subsidies, reducing public debt levels, and increasing international reserves as current account positions improve. Some countries can consider raising energy taxes to improve fiscal positions and compensate for negative externalities (adverse effects) from fuel consumption.
 For oil importers facing deflationary risks, authorities should not save any of the windfall (again, when the windfall accrues to the private sector, there is no need for active policy measures to adjust public saving) and will need to ensure inflation expectations remain anchored to avoid falling into a debt-deflation spiral, including, if needed, through unconventional monetary policy.
 Emerging market economies and low-income countries with policy space should spend part-or all-of their windfalls on longer-term growth-enhancing spending (infrastructure, education, and tax cuts).
C. Medium-Term Policies
Over the medium term, oil exporters would benefit from a number of structural reforms. These reforms are beneficial in their own right, but lower oil prices strengthen the case for commencing implementation early on. The priorities include the following:
 Fiscal consolidation and frameworks. Fiscal policies should be recalibrated to lower oil prices, with the speed of adjustment determined by the extent of vulnerabilities. The adjustment should favor growth, equity considerations, and developing the noncommodity sector. Most oil exporters also need to either establish, or enhance, their medium-term fiscal frameworks.
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 Diversification. Real and financial sector reforms aimed at strengthening the private sector would help boost non-oil growth.
 Financial sector policies. Exporters would benefit from strengthening liquidity management, enhancing early-warning systems, addressing concentration risks in the financial system, and deepening the financial sector.
 More flexible exchange rate regime. Some countries could consider greater flexibility, but others will have to rely almost entirely on fiscal policy adjustment to attain a current account that is consistent with fundamentals and chosen policy settings. The decision (and timing) to move to greater exchange rate flexibility will depend mainly on factors such as the capacity to conduct independent monetary policy, credibility of the peg, financial depth, the degree of economic diversification, and the flexibility of fiscal policy. Where the domestic non-oil sector is small and imports and services provided by foreign workers are very large, exchange rate shifts have a limited role in facilitating the needed adjustment in demand and the external balance.
 Reform of energy prices and taxation. As detailed in Box 6, both exporters and importers should take advantage of lower oil prices to remove distortions such as fuel subsidies and should consider increasing energy prices/taxes where appropriate, to create space for accompanying growth enhancing fiscal measures. Targeted mitigation measures and communication strategies will be crucial to secure political buy-in. In a number of low-and middle-income countries, energy sector reforms to broaden access to reliable energy would have important development benefits.
 Other considerations. Many countries would benefit from greater fiscal transparency, including by exposing quasi-fiscal activities of the energy-sector state-owned enterprises.
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Inflation expectations in advanced oil importers need to be closely monitored. Distributional effects of policies (such as the inclusiveness of growth) should also be taken into account. 21 From the 33 oil exporters reviewed for this paper, only 13 have some form of a fiscal rule, of which only 5 oil exporters explicitly incorporate rules related to oil prices. Implications of oil price uncertainty for fiscal frameworks in oil exporting countries will be considered in the Fall 2015 edition of the IMF's Fiscal Monitor. 22 The Government Finance Statistics Manual 2014 provides a suitable conceptual framework for analyzing the performance of the general government and the broader public sector. The IMF has also introduced a statistics template for revenues from mineral and energy resources, which has been adopted by the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative and is currently being field-tested in six countries.
Box 6. Energy Price Reform
The low oil prices open a window of opportunity to increase domestic energy prices toward international levels and avoid a large gap reopening in the future. Both oil exporters and oil importers should work toward fully liberalizing domestic prices or adopting automatic pricing formulas to lock in the savings. The use of targeted transfers, financed with fiscal savings from higher fuel prices, would protect the most vulnerable groups.
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It may also be appropriate to increase energy taxes in many countries. There are both revenue and environmental considerations for this recommendation, including the following:
 Strengthening the fiscal position. Resources could be used to reduce fiscal vulnerabilities or to finance key spending priorities (for example, social or investment). In addition, in countries with high unemployment, reductions in labor taxation could be financed through higher taxation of fuel products.
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 Limiting the negative spillovers (for example, environmental costs and inefficiencies). These are typically larger where fuel products are cheaper, due to higher consumption.
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According to the latest IMF estimates, the global costs of low energy prices are sizable.
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The "pre-tax subsidies", which arise because the price paid by consumers in some countries is below the opportunity/supply cost, amount to some $330 billion globally.
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"Post-tax subsidies," which also include the health effects of local pollution, costs of traffic congestion, impact of global warming, and other factors are estimated by Coady and others (2015) at a staggering $5.3 trillion. While these figures are naturally subject to substantial uncertainty, their magnitude highlights the need for urgent policy action in this area.
Budget transparency of the costs of low energy prices should also be improved. Budget documents should reflect the true size of implicit and explicit fuel subsidies, allowing a more transparent analysis of the trade-off between budget priorities. Moreover, more transparency of accounts of energy-related state-owned enterprises will help ensure that the portion of the windfall that accrues to them is utilized in a way that is consistent with the overall fiscal strategy. 
